"Leviathan": Defining Liberty

“By Liberty, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external Impediments.” Leviathan, ch. 14, at 64.

On a similar liberty under U.S. Const., amends. 5, 14 (“life, liberty, or property without due process of law”), see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.”); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (quoting Greenholz v. Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“Liberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”)); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-674 (1977) (“While the contours of this historic liberty interest in the context of our federal system of government have not been defined precisely, they always have been thought to encompass freedom from bodily restraint and punishment.”).

On a similar liberty in English law, see Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley; ‘The right to one’s person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone,’” quoting Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts, 29 (2nd ed. Chicago: Callghan & Co. 1888)) (quoted by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990)).