Wednesday, June 22, 2011

Disambiguating "Proceeding"

In law, the noun “proceeding,” which is used interchangeably with its plural “proceedings,” is ambiguous, having at least two basic meanings.
For usage indicating that courts use the word “proceeding” interchangeably in the singular or plural, compare Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967) (Brennan, J); (“The taking of the exemplars was not a ‘critical’ stage of the criminal proceedings”) (emphasis added); id. at 278 (Black, J dissenting in this part) (“The Court rejects Gilbert's right-to-counsel contention in connection with the handwriting exemplars on the ground that the taking of the exemplars ‘was not a ‘critical’ stage of the criminal proceedings entitling petitioner to the assistance of counsel.’ In all reality, however, it was one of the most ‘critical’ stages of the government proceedings that ended in Gilbert's conviction.”) (emphasis added); id. at 291 (Fortas, J dissenting in this part) (“The giving of a handwriting exemplar is a ‘critical stage’ of the proceeding, as my Brother Black states.”) (emphasis added).

It can refer to the entire process of a lawsuit: “The regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1324 (9th ed. 2009) (first definition of four general legal definitions).

See Townsend, 372 U.S. at 296 (“That court, considering only the pleadings filed in the course of that proceeding and the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court rendered on direct appeal, denied the writ.”).
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (Stewart, J) (“points of time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”) (quoted by Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227 (1977) (Powell, J); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-470 (1981) (Burger, CJ); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984) (Rehnquist, J); Moran v. Burbine, 474 U.S. 412, 429-30 (1986) ( McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991) (Scalia, J)).
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 42 (1981) (Blackmun, J dissenting) (“The method chosen by North Carolina to extinguish parental rights resembles in many respects a criminal prosecution.…The State initiates the proceeding by filing a petition in district court….”).
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 57 (1975) (White, J) (“There is no logical inconsistency between a finding of probable cause and an acquittal in a criminal proceeding”).
For usage in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel characterizing certain events like arraignment, voir dire, trial, and sentencing of the trial as stages of a larger “proceeding,” see Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (Douglas, J) (“Whatever may be the function and importance of arraignment in other jurisdictions, we have said enough to show that in Alabama it is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding.”) (emphasis added); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989) (Stevens, J) (“[I]n affirming voir dire as a critical stage of the criminal proceeding, during which the defendant has a constitutional right to be present, the Court wrote….”) (emphasis added); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (Rehnquist, J) (“At the trial stage of a criminal proceeding, the right of an indigent defendant to counsel is fundamental and binding upon the States by virtue of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.”) (emphasis added); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (Stevens, J) (“Even though the defendant has no substantive right to a particular sentence within the range authorized by statute, the sentencing is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding at which he is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel.”) (emphasis added).
For usage indicating an equivalence between “proceeding” with a case or broader process, compare Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 3 (1970) (Brennan, J) (critical stage of the “prosecution”); and id. at 10 (still Brennan, J) (critical stage of the “criminal process”); id. at 12 (Black, J concurring) (critical stage of the “proceedings”); id. at 23 (Burger, CJ dissenting) (critical stage of a “criminal case”).
Also compare United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n. 25 (1984) (Stevens, J) (critical stage of the “proceeding.”); with id. at 662 (still Stevens, J) (critical stage of the “prosecution”).
It can also refer to an “act or step that is part of a larger action,” such as a “hearing.” Black’s Law Dictionary, supra (third and fourth definitions).
Compare, e.g., United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 524 (1985) (per curiam) (in-camera “proceeding”); with id. (in-camera “meeting”); id. (in-camera “interview”); id. at 525, 26, 27 (in-camera “discussion”); id at. 528 (in-camera “conference”).
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978) (Blackmun, J) (“Second, the hearing before the magistrate not always will suffice to discourage lawless or reckless misconduct. The pre-search proceeding is necessarily ex parte, since the subject of the search cannot be tipped off to the application for a warrant lest he destroy or remove evidence.”) (emphasis added and omitted from the Latin).
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 475 (1972) (Burger, CJ) (“…if the choice were between a full-scale adversary proceeding or no hearing at all.”).
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975) (“The sole issue is whether there is probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing. The standard is the same as that for arrest. That standard—probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime—traditionally has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court has approved these informal modes of proof.”) (emphasis added).
Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 493 (1973) (Burger, CJ) (“With such safeguards, we do not perceive that an adversary hearing prior to a seizure by lawful warrant would materially increase First Amendment protection. The necessity for a prior judicial determination of probable cause will protect against gross abuses, while the availability of a prompt judicial determination in an adversary proceeding following the seizure assures that difficult marginal cases will be fully considered in light of First Amendment guarantees, with only a minimal interference with public circulation pending litigation.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 402 (1965) (“Since the preliminary hearing there, as in Hamilton was one in which pleas to the charge could be made, we held in White as in Hamilton that a preliminary proceeding of that nature was so critical a stage in the prosecution that a defendant at that point was entitled to counsel.”) (emphasis added and omitted from case names).
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66 (1906) (“While there may be some doubt whether the examination of witnesses before a grand jury is a suit or prosecution, we have no doubt that it is a ‘proceeding’ within the meaning of this proviso. The word should receive as wide a construction as is necessary to protect the witness in his disclosures, whenever such disclosures are made in pursuance of a judicial inquiry, whether such inquiry be instituted by a grand jury, or upon the trial of an indictment found by them. The word ‘proceeding’ is not a technical one, and is aptly used by courts to designate an inquiry before a grand jury.").

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