More on Free Speech, but with Limitations

I found this interesting little intersection between Robert's Rules of Order and freedom of speech and assembly in constitutional law:

“A society has the right to determine who may be present at its meeting and to control its hall while meetings are in progress. * * * [A]ll members have the right to attend [with certain exceptions]. Nonmembers on the other hand…can be excluded at any time from part or all of a metting of a society, or from all of its meetings. * * * All persons present at a meeting have an obligation to obey the legitimate orders of the presiding officer.”

RONR (10^th ed.), § 61, p. 625, ll. 11-30.

“With this framework, we agree with the District Court that summary judgment against David Eichenlaub on his restraint of speech and petition claims was appropriate. The record of the September 14, 1999 meeting discloses that he was repetitive and truculent, and that he repeatedly interrupted the chairman of the meeting. Restricting such behavior is the sort of time, place, and manner regulation that passes muster under the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum. Indeed, for the presiding officer of a public meeting to allow a speaker to try to hijack the proceedings, or to filibuster them, would impinge on the First Amendment rights of other would-be participants. We have no difficulty sustaining the decision to remove [the plaintiff] on that basis.”

Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 281 (3^rd Cir. 2004) (construing  U.S. Const., amend. I); see also Vacca v. Barletta, 933 F.2d 31 (1^st Cir. 1991).